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The importance of  monetary stability derives from the significant in- 
dependent influence of  monetary change on the subsequent course of 
economic activity. If  money did not matter at all or were of  only sec- 
ondary importance in affecting the flow of spending, income, and prices, 
monetary stability would be of little relevance. 
Our views reflect theoretical models and the empirical evidence test- 
ing them that establish a close relation between economic stability and 
monetary stability, and between inflation and monetary growth in ex- 
cess of  the rate of real growth. Hence a stable monetary environment 
is crucial to achieve economic stability encompassing both stable prices 
and real growth immune to wide swings. The essential element required 
to generate a stable monetary environment is systematic policy, so as 
to minimize monetary shocks to the expectations of economic agents. 
Discretionary policy is unsystematic, hence fails this test. Increasing 
the variability of money growth in an attempt to fine-tune the economy 
will make the variance of real output greater than it would otherwise 
have been. An economy in which countercyclical policy is followed 
will end up with unstable money and unstable real output. 
Postwar developments in monetary theory have shifted the issues 
that were the original centerpieces of analysis supporting the case for 
stable money. Correspondingly, the kinds of evidence suggested to test 
the analysis have changed to reflect the nature of the issues that are 
highlighted. We examine the developments in chronological order, be- 
ginning with Friedman’s case for stable money, based on a theoretical 
argument against the pursuit of countercyclical stabilization policy (sec- 
tion 10.1). Section 10.2 then examines the opposing theory of economic 
policy associated with Theil and Tinbergen and the Phillips curve anal- 
ysis. That theory holds that countercyclical policy can be employed to 
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stabilize the economy and that stable monetary policy is not decisive 
for that purpose.  Successful countercyclical policy  would achieve a 
standard deviation of money growth that would precisely offset the 
standard deviation of real economic growth that would otherwise occur, 
and thereby reduce the variance of real output below that of money. 
The section concludes with a discussion of the natural rate hypothesis 
that was the culmination of the Phillips curve analysis. The latest de- 
velopment we cover is the rational expectations hypothesis (section 
10.3). In each section we examine the implications of the theory for 
the stable money view and report the available evidence. In section 
10.4 we summarize the case for a legislated rule and present some new 
evidence for a monetary growth rule.  Section 10.5 concludes with a 
brief discussion of the role that a constant monetary growth rule plays 
in the views of the schools of global monetarism, of Austrian econom- 
ics, and of the new monetary economics. 
10.1  The Case against Discretionary Monetary Policy 
The general case against discretionary monetary policy formulated 
by Friedman (1953) is that, to function well, stabilization policy must 
offset random disturbances to economic activity; that is, it should re- 
move the variation in income due to those disturbances. To  achieve 
such a goal, two conditions must be satisfied: one involving timing, 
and the other involving the magnitude of the policy action. The timing 
of the policy action should conform to that of the disturbance, and the 
size of  the policy  action should  be  congruent  with  the size of  the 
disturbance. If both conditions are not satisfied, the policy response 
will be insufficient and may even be destabilizing. 
Friedman (1948, 1953) went on to argue that the lags in the effect of 
discretionary monetary policy are likely to be long and variable, re- 
flecting both an “inside lag’’-the  time that elapsed before the monetary 
authority responded  to the disturbance-and  an ‘‘outside lag’’-the 
time that elapsed before changes in monetary growth affect economic 
activity. As a result, discretionary policy actions might exacerbate rather 
than mitigate cyclical disturbances. In addition, Friedman contended 
that there was no basis for believing that policymakers (and the eco- 
nomics profession) possess the detailed knowledge of the economy’s 
complex interactions and of the lag structure requisite for the pursuit 
of successful countercyclical policies or for fine-tuning. Furthermore, 
in his  view, even well-meaning monetary  authorities  were  likely to 
respond to political influences. Politically advantageous, short-run ac- 
tions by the authorities would ignore the long-run destabilizing con- 
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stances and from evidence to be considered in what follows was that 
monetary policy should be based on a legislated rule instructing the 
Federal Reserve to increase the quantity of money, or high-powered 
money, on a year-to-year basis at a steady known rate of growth. 
Friedman did not allege that such a prescription would yield nirvana. 
He allowed for the possible accretion of knowledge of the operation 
of the economy once the rule was adopted that would permit improving 
it. Adoption of the rule would not eliminate cyclical change, but the 
rule would remove disturbances arising from erratic fluctuations in the 
supply of money. The effect would be to reduce the amplitude of the 
random shocks to real economic growth inherent in the operation of 
the economy. 
Several types of evidence have been used to evaluate the case for a 
monetary rule, namely: the statistical record of changes in money growth 
rates and their relation  to changes in economic activity; qualitative 
historical data; and simulations of the hypothetical path of economic 
activity under an assumed monetary growth rule, compared with the 
actual path. We  first report the statistical and historical evidence. 
One body of evidence, of which Clark Warburton was the author, 
predated Friedman’s theoretical case against discretionary monetary 
policy. Warburton’s writings from the early 1940s, when the Keynesian 
revolution was in full swing, until the end of his life in  1980, were in 
the quantity of money tradition and stressed the importance of mon- 
etary disequilibrium as the fundamental cause of business fluctuations. 
At the time that Warburton’s views first appeared, attention to the role 
of money had all but vanished from professional work. His main evi- 
dence was based on deviations from trend of quarterly money data for 
the period  1918-65.  He demonstrated that turning points in money 
preceded those in business, and concluded: “[Aln erratic money supply 
[was] the chief originating factor in business recessions and not merely 
an intensifying force in the case of severe depressions” (1966, Intro., 
p. 9). Warburton also cited, as prime examples of the harmful effects 
of discretionary policy, the mistakes of the Federal Reserve System 
that produced the great contraction of 1929-33  and the contraction of 
Since the time of the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, 
annual deviations in the quantity of money from a reasonable rate 
of growth have ranged from more than 30 percent excess to nearly 
20 percent deficiency. There is no known need for annual variations 
in the quantity of money, from the estimated reasonable rate of growth, 
of  more than 2 percent, and annual variations in the quantity of 
money outside this range have been invariably associated with busi- 
ness instability and with inflation or depression. The range of addi- 
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tional variation for seasonal purposes is probably not more than three 
percent. (1966, chap. 17 [1952b], pp. 368-69) 
The dismal record of the Federal Reserve led Warburton to strongly 
favor a legislated monetary rule that would limit the growth rate of 
money, for a given definition, to three percent per annum.’ 
The evidence provided by Friedman and his associates also utilized 
statistical and qualitative historical data. Unlike Warburton, who ex- 
pressed the data as deviations from trend, Friedman and Schwartz 
used first differences of the logarithms of the money series. They then 
selected turning points in the series from 1867 to 1960, and compared 
the peaks and troughs in the percentage rate of  change of  the money 
stock with peaks and troughs in general business as dated by the Na- 
tional Bureau of  Economic Research reference cycle chronology. On 
average, of the 18 nonwar cycles since 1870, peaks in the rate of change 
of  the stock of  money preceded reference peaks by  16 months, and 
troughs in the rate of change of the stock of money preceded reference 
troughs by  12 months. On this basis, they argued strongly that: “Ap- 
preciable changes in the rate of growth of  the stock of  money are a 
necessary and sufficient condition for appreciable changes in the rate 
of growth of money income”; and, “this is true both for long secular 
changes and also for changes roughly the length of  business cycles” 
(1963a, p. 53). Using a different methodology over the same period, 
William Poole (1975) found that the evidence supported the Friedman 
and Schwartz conclusion. 
To the question whether money changes conformed positively to the 
business cycle with a lead or inversely with a lag, the answer Friedman 
and Schwartz gave was that the dispersion (measured by the standard 
deviation) of the leads and lags, as computed under the two interpre- 
tations, is uniformly lower when the money series is treated as con- 
forming positively. Serial correlations, furthermore, of expansions with 
succeeding contractions and of  contractions with succeeding expan- 
sions display the same patterns for the money change series and a 
proxy indicator of physical change in general business. Expansions in 
both series are not systematically correlated with the succeeding con- 
tractions, whereas contractions in both series are highly correlated with 
the succeeding expansions. This evidence supports the positive inter- 
pretation of the relation of money changes to the business cycle. 0th- 
erwise, if  inverted conformity were the case and changes in business 
produced later changes in  the opposite direction in money, then the 
correlations with the succeeding reference cycle phase for money and 
the physical change in general business measure should be opposite. 
But the pattern for business does reflect, with a lag, the pattern for 
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Statistical evidence provided by Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p. 
594) matched periods with a low standard deviation of  year-to-year 
percentage changes in monetary growth with comparable periods in 
velocity, real income, and wholesale prices. They also matched periods 
with a high standard deviation of year-to-year changes in monetary 
growth with comparable periods in the other magnitudes. In the nine 
decades,  1869- 1960, four periods of comparative stability in money 
growth were accompanied by relative stability of the rate of growth of 
output and the rate of change of prices:  1882-92;  1903-13:  1923-29; 
1948-60.  All other periods were characterized by unusually unstable 
money growth rates and unusually unstable rates of growth of output 
and rates of change of prices. 
The qualitative historical evidence that Friedman and Schwartz ex- 
amined also supported the conclusion that erratic money changes, as 
a result of discretionary actions by the authorities, were accompanied 
by economic changes in the same direction. Moreover, in a number of 
episodes when monetary changes had led changes in economic activity, 
the evidence that the monetary changes were independent of the changes 
in activity was irrefutable. 
We  now turn to the simulation studies that compare the hypothetical 
behavior of the U.S.  economy under an assumed constant money growth 
rate rule with actual economic performance. The evidence is mixed. 
Friedman (1960) found that a rule would have outperformed discre- 
tionary policy in the interwar period, but that the case for the post- 
World War I1 period was less clear-cut. For the postwar period, at least 
until  the mid- 1960s, most  studies (Bronfenbrenner  1961 ;  Modigliani 
1964; Argy 1971) concluded that discretionary policy outperformed a 
3 or 4 percent monetary growth rule. One inference might be that the 
Federal Reserve had learned from its “mistakes” in the interwar period. 
Recently, however, Argy (1979) found that for the period from the late 
1960s to the late 1970s, a simulated monetary growth rule for a sample 
of nine industrial countries would have reduced the variance of real 
growth considerably below its actual variance. 
Finally, Kochin (1980) found that over much of the postwar period 
U.S. monetary policy was destabilizing. His study, based on an inter- 
pretation of the results of  several economic models, followed Fried- 
man’s (1953) procedure for evaluating stabilization policy. 
10.2  Keynesian Riposte and Return Sally 
An analytical development that favored intervention along Keynesian 
lines was the Theil-Tinbergen theory of economic policy. That approach 
provided policymakers with an array of instruments-monetary,  fiscal, 
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to goals following the principle of comparative advantage. This theory 
of economic policy combined with the use of optimal control proce- 
dures led to a strong case for fine-tuning. It was held that policymakers 
could devise feedback rules between real economic activity and mon- 
etary and fiscal policy that could be applied to offset disturbances to 
the private sector. 
Another development that apparently advanced the case for coun- 
tercyclical policy was the Phillips curve tradeoff. Phillips (1958), Sam- 
uelson and Solow (1960), and Lipsey (1960b) reported evidence of a 
stable inverse relationship for the U.K., the US.,  and other countries 
between the rate of change of money wages (alternatively, the rate of 
change of the price level) and the level of unemployment. The findings 
led to the view  that policymakers  could  choose, based  on a  social 
preference function, between high inflation and low employment, or 
low inflation and high unemployment, the desired choice to be achieved 
by discretionary monetary and fiscal policy. 
The upshot of these developments was that many economists came 
to believe that the economy could be stabilized at any desired level of 
activity.  Friedman’s  objections  to fine-tuning seemed  to have been 
circumvented. 
Friedman’s  response came in his  1967 presidential  address to the 
American  Economic Association.  He argued that the Phillips curve 
tradeoff was a statistical illusion arising from the failure to account for 
inflationary expectations. Monetary and fiscal policy could stabilize the 
economy at some arbitrary level of output or employment, but only 
temporarily and, even then, only at the expense of accelerating inflation 
or deflation. Both Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) modified the Phil- 
lips curve approach by applying the concept of the natural rate em- 
ployment-that  rate consistent with the microeconomic decisions of 
firms and workers active in the labor force. The natural rate of em- 
ployment  reflects the optimal choice of workers between labor and 
leisure and the optimal mix of labor and other factors of production 
for firms in a dynamic economy. According to the “natural  rate hy- 
pothesis,” the natural rate of employment is determined by the inter- 
section of the demand and supply curves for labor, given demographic 
factors and labor market institutions. Hence deviations of employment 
from the natural rate are produced only by imperfect information and 
the costs of acquiring information that affect job search. 
One explanation given for such imperfections in information was that 
employers and workers have different perceptions of changes in real 
wage rates. It was argued that firms always have perfect information 
on the prices of their output so that for them actual and expected real 
wages are always equal. In contrast, workers base their evaluations of 
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inflation will  be over the duration of  their contracts.  For  example, 
suppose inflation is rising and workers’ expectations do  not fully reflect 
the higher inflation rate. Faced with lower real wage rates, firms will 
be willing to expand employment, which will put upward pressure on 
nominal wages. The result will appear as a movement along the (short- 
run) Phillips curve. However, once workers adjust their expectations 
to the higher inflation rate, they will demand higher money wages. The 
resultant rise in real wage rates will cause firms to reduce employment 
to its previous level. The economy will then return to the natural rate 
of unemployment consistent with labor market forces, but at a higher 
rate of inflation. 
The measured unemployment rate is thus assumed to depend on the 
natural unemployment rate and the difference between the actual and 
expected inflation rates; that is, on the inflation forecast error, with 
some rate of adjustment of the unemployment rate to the forecast error. 
As long as the  actual and expected inflation rates differ, measured 
unemployment can differ from the natural rate. However, in the long 
run, actual and expected inflation rates converge, and hence, measured 
unemployment reverts to the natural rate, though this adjustment pro- 
cess may be sluggish. 
The theory of search is an alternative way of  explaining unemploy- 
ment. This theory posits that the natural rate of unemployment is de- 
termined by long-run demographic forces, but that deviations from the 
natural rate are caused by  short-run factors affecting the costs and 
duration of search. 
The policy implication that emerged from the natural rate hypothesis 
was that stabilization policies aimed at reducing unemployment below 
the natural rate would have only temporary success. Any attempt to 
achieve permanent results would produce accelerating, and ultimately 
runaway, inflation. In addition, policies designed to peg the unemploy- 
ment rate at the natural rate could lead easily to an explosive inflation 
or deflation if  the forces determining the natural rate were to change. 
Such forces include changes in the labor force skill mix and demo- 
graphic  determinants of the labor force.  Thus, the natural rate hy- 
pothesis strengthens the case for monetary stability, since monetary 
instability would produce deviations between the expected and actual 
inflation rates, causing fluctuations in unemployment and output. 
10.3  The Rational Expectations Hypothesis and the 
Case for Stable Money 
Recent advances in the treatment of expectations supplement the 
case for monetary  stability  implied by  the natural rate hypothesis. 
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act rationally  with respect to the gathering and processing of  infor- 
mation, just as they do with respect to any other activity (Muth 1961). 
This proposition implies that agents will not make persistent forecast 
errors. If  their forecasts turn out to be wrong, agents will learn the 
reason for their errors and revise their methods of forecasting accord- 
ingly.  Such an approach seems more reasonable than alternative ap- 
proaches commonly used to model expectations, such as static expec- 
tations  that  simply  extrapolate  existing  conditions,  or  adaptive 
expectations that have the property  of  yielding continuous forecast 
errors. Additionally, in contrast to the adaptive expectations approach 
that uses only past values of the variable about which expectations are 
to be formed, the rational expectations hypothesis also uses other rel- 
evant information. 
The rational expectations model assumes that private agents form 
expectations about the rate of inflation based on their understanding 
of the economic model that generates the inflation rate, as well as on 
the policy rule followed by the monetary authorities. 
In a model based on rationally  formed expectations, Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) demonstrated that systematic monetary policy would 
be completely ineffective  in influencing real variables.  They argued 
that if the monetary authorities devised a monetary feedback rule, using 
optimal feedback techniques, according to which the authorities sys- 
tematically altered  the  money  supply to offset disturbances in  real 
economic activity, then private decision-makers would learn the rule 
and incorporate it into their rational expectations.  The thrust of this 
model-where  deviations of output from its full employment (or nat- 
ural) level can only be produced by an inflation forecast error-is  that 
if expectations are formed rationally, the forecast error cannot be ma- 
nipulated by systematic (and, therefore, anticipated) monetary or fiscal 
policy. Indeed, the only way output or unemployment can be altered 
from its natural rate is by an unexpected shock. However, unexpected 
shocks-monetary  or other-have  the negative attribute of  increasing 
the level of uncertainty in the economy. 
If a negatively sloping Phillips curve were observed, it might result 
from constant price expectations in a period with ex post fluctuations 
in actual inflation due to unanticipated random shocks that are nega- 
tively correlated with ex post fluctuations in measured unemployment 
(Begg 1982, p.  141). Lucas (1973) offered a variant explanation, in a 
world of rational expectations, for a negatively sloped short-run Phillips 
curve or, alternatively, a positively sloped short-run supply curve for 
output,  which  is  determined  by  lagged output and the discrepancy 
between actual and expected inflation. Lucas assumed that the econ- 
omy is characterized by uncertainty, and that competitive firms cannot 
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change in the price level or a change in relative prices. He then dem- 
onstrated that other things equal, the greater the variance of the ag- 
gregate price level, owing to greater monetary variability, the more 
likely it is that firms will mistake a price level change for a change in 
relative prices. Expansion of output in response to an increase in the 
level of prices, holding relative prices constant, will ultimately lead to 
accumulation of inventory, cutbacks in output, layoffs, and more ine- 
lastic supply curves and also a more inelastic aggregate supply and 
Phillips curve. In addition, greater price level variability will be as- 
sociated with greater resource misallocation because price level vari- 
ability impairs the ability to perceive the information that prices convey 
in a market economy. 
Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980) perceive the problem  of 
extracting the signal from prices somewhat differently from Lucas. For 
them, the distinction that needs to be made is not the sorting out of 
aggregate from relative price changes. It is rather the distinction be- 
tween transitory and permanent price changes. Firms will wait to learn 
whether a change is permanent before reacting to it and, with great 
price variability, that process is made more difficult and prolonged than 
would otherwise be the case. 
In any event, price variability reflecting discretionary money vari- 
ability clearly has negative effects on the economy and reinforces the 
case for monetary stability. Moreover, the entire enterprise of selecting 
discretionary policies by simulation of econometric models has been 
challenged by Lucas (1976). His critique was based on the kinds of 
equations  that are used in econometric  models.  These are reduced 
forms of effects on the economy of existing policy arrangements that 
incorporate the private sector’s expectations of policy effects on eco- 
nomic variables. Were the authorities to change the policy rule, the 
public  would  adjust  its  expectations  accordingly.  Consequently, at- 
tempts to forecast the effects of alternative policies without accounting 
for changes in private agents’ expectations  are bound  to lead to in- 
appropriate policies. 
Discretionary policy (defined as policy reacting to the current situ- 
ation) based on optimal control techniques has been shown by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) to be suboptimal and possibly destabilizing in a 
world of rational expectations. The policy chosen at each point in time 
may be the best, given the current situation. In the authors’ terminol- 
ogy, the policy may be consistent, but it will be suboptimal because 
the policymaker has failed to take into account the optimizing rules of 
economic agents. The decisions of agents will change as they come to 
recognize the change in policy. The example Kydland and Prescott cite 
is that agents may expect tax rates to be lowered in recessions and 
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Over successive periods, it is not optimal to continue with the initial 
policy because control theory is not the appropriate tool for dynamic 
economic planning. Current decisions of economic agents are affected 
by what they expect future policy to be. A government that attempted 
to reduce unemployment by increasing the money supply without at- 
tention to the rational inflation expectations of private agents would 
end up with a suboptimal mix of the natural rate of unemployment and 
positive inflation, despite the fact that it sought to maximize its “social 
welfare function” by combining the desirability of full employment and 
zero inflation. The authors conclude (1977, p. 487): 
The implication of this analysis is that, until we have . . .  [a tested 
theory of economic fluctuations], active stabilization may very well 
be dangerous and it is best that it not be attempted. Reliance on 
policies such as a constant growth in the money supply and constant 
tax rates constitute a safe course of action. When we do have the 
prerequisite understanding of the business cycle, the implication of 
our analysis is that policymakers should follow rules rather than have 
discretion. The reason that they should not have discretion is not 
that they are stupid or evil but, rather, that discretion implies se- 
lecting the decision which is best, given the current situation. Such 
behavior either results in consistent but suboptimal planning or in 
economic instability. 
Oversimplication by certain proponents of the rational expectations 
hypothesis should be noted. A number of factors could lead to non- 
neutral effects of anticipated monetary growth even in the presence of 
rational expectations. First, anticipated monetary growth can have ef- 
fects on the natural rate of unemployment (output) through a real bal- 
ance effect on the aggregate expenditure function, or by changing the 
steady state capital-labor ratio and thus affecting the real rate of interest 
(Buiter 1980). 
Second, if  the assumption that both government  and the private 
sector have equal access to information is violated when there is a rule 
for systematic monetary policy, then it is possible for the government 
to change its policy after the private sector has formed its expectations 
and thereby affect the inflation forecast error. As a result, output and 
unemployment can deviate from the natural rate. Such an outcome is 
also possible in  cases where  wages  are determined  by multi-period 
overlapping contracts (Fischer 1977). In that situation, even if private 
agents form their expectations rationally, the government can system- 
atically  affect output and employment between  contract negotiating 
dates. Third, if the assumption of market clearing is abandoned, yet 
the assumption of rational expectations is maintained, then it is possible 
for output to be affected by stabilization policy. Explanations for price 
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1980) to price setting behavior in a world of high coordination costs 
(Cagan 1980). 
Fourth, evidence of persistence-that  unemployment does not rap- 
idly disappear and bring the economy to full employment--or  alter- 
natively, the existence of serial correlation of output and employment 
over the business cycle, has been advanced as contradicting the rational 
expectations approach. On the other hand, McCallum (1980) explains 
persistence within the rational expectations context as reflecting real 
costs of adjusting the fixed capital stock and other factors of production. 
For Lucas (1979, persistence occurs because of information lags that 
prevent “even relevant past variables from becoming perfectly known” 
(p. 11 14), and an accelerationist effect of physical capital. Finally, the 
rational expectations approach fails to explain how private agents learn 
from their forecast errors in forming rational expectations (De Canio 
1979). 
We  now turn to the evidence for the rational expectations hypothesis. 
The evidence most generally cited is that by Barro (1977a, 1977b, 1981) 
and Barro and Rush (1980). Barro and Rush regressed the unemploy- 
ment rate over the 1949-77  period on lagged values of a measure of 
unexpected monetary growth and of expected monetary growth. Ex- 
pected monetary growth was estimated from a regression of current 
monetary growth on past monetary growth, the deviation of govern- 
ment spending from its trend, and past unemployment. Such a regres- 
sion was designed to capture the monetary rule that economic agents 
perceived. The predicted  values of the regression were employed to 
represent expected monetary growth, and the residuals, to represent 
unexpected monetary growth. 
Barro and Rush found most of the variation in unemployment was 
explained by unexpected monetary growth, and that expected mone- 
tary growth was not statistically significant. They concluded that ex- 
pected monetary growth is neutral and that only unsystematic elements 
of  monetary policy affect the unemployment  rate-a  finding that  is 
supportive of the rational expectations hypothesis. 
The evidence that Barro has presented-that  only unexpected mon- 
etary growth  explains  variations in  unemployment-has  been  chal- 
lenged. Cagan (1980) argued, following a more traditional approach, 
that most variations in output and employment can be explained by 
deviations in money growth from a long-run trend, without invoking 
rational expectations. Sargent (1976) demonstrated that it is difficult to 
distinguish Barro’s results from those produced by a more traditional 
approach because of the observational equivalence of natural and un- 
natural rate theories.  For Sargent, the only way to test  a refutable 
hypothesis is to be able to isolate periods involving a change in clear- 
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be shown that the full effect of a change in nominal income is absorbed 
by price change, the case for the neutrality hypothesis is not confirmed. 
In his view, to the extent that some of the effect of expected monetary 
growth is absorbed by output change, scope remains for stabilization 
policy. Mishkin (1982) also finds that anticipated movements in mon- 
etary growth have effects on output and unemployment that are larger 
than those of unanticipated movements, but his evidence confirms that 
expectations are rational. 
The rational expectations approach appears to be firmly established, 
despite unresolved questions including those mentioned above. A clear 
implication of the literature is that active monetary intervention is likely 
to lead to large price level changes with little favorable effect on output 
or employment. Unpredictable policies are likely to increase the degree 
of uncertainty in the economy and enlarge the fluctuations around the 
natural rate. The aim of policy should therefore be to establish pre- 
dictable monetary rules, preferably rules that are easily understood, 
with full consideration of all the relevant costs and benefits. 
10.4  The Case for a Legislated Rule 
Modigliani’s presidential address to the American Economic Asso- 
ciation (1977) disputed monetarist views that (a) the economy is suf- 
ficiently shockproof that stabilization policies are not needed; (b) postwar 
fluctuations resulted from unstable monetary growth; (c) stabilization 
policies decreased rather than increased stability. He finds that “Up 
to 1974, these [stabilization] policies have helped to keep the economy 
reasonably stable by historical  standards, even though one can cer- 
tainly point to some occasional failures” (1977, p.  17). He attributes 
the serious deterioration in economic stability since 1973 to “the novel 
nature of the shocks that hit us, namely, supply shocks. Even the best 
possible  aggregate  demand  management  cannot offset  such shocks 
without a lot of unemployment together with a lot of inflation. But, in 
addition, demand management was far from the best.”  The failure, he 
contends, was the result of ineffective use of stabilization policy “in- 
cluding too slavish adherence to the monetarists’ constant money growth 
prescription .” 
Modigliani’s defense of  stabilization policies amounts to acknowl- 
edging specific failures while asserting overall success, except when 
exogenous supply shocks occur which “we had little experience or 
even an adequate conceptual framework to deal with” (1977, p.  17). 
Table 10.1 shows the standard deviations of quarter-to-quarter de- 
viations of a two-quarter moving average from a 20-quarter growth rate 
of M1. The standard deviations are a proxy for unexpected monetary 
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Table 10.1  Comparative Variability of  Monetary Growth  and Rates of Change 
of  Real GNP, Postwar Subperiods Quarterly, 1952I-l982III 
Standard Deviation of Quarter-to- 
Quarter Percentage Changes in: 
Period 
Deviations from a 
20-Quarter Moving 










1961  1-  197  1 I1 













Note: We are indebted to the division of research of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank 
for the data underlying col. 1. 
should be associated with consequent effects on  real output and, once 
fully anticipated, on prices. The table, therefore, also shows the stan- 
dard deviations of  quarter-to-quarter annualized real output growth 
rates for three postwar subperiods: 19521 to 1960IV; 19611 to 197111 
(alternatively, 1973111); 1971111 (1973IV) to 1982111. 
The variability of the (unexpected) money series declined moderately 
during the 1960s and until the quarter preceding the Nixon price con- 
trols or, alternatively, the quarter preceding the 1973 oil price shock. 
Over the same subperiods, real output variability also declined, but 
substantially more than the decline in money variability. In the final 
subperiods, both money variability and real output variability rose to 
levels exceeding the ones prevailing in the initial subperiod.2 
Modigliani’s attribution of the serious deterioration of economic sta- 
bility since 1973 to “too slavish adherence to the monetarists’ constant 
money growth rule”  is not  apparent in  table  10.1. The inability of 
stabilization policy to cope with unexpected developments supports 
monetarist views. If policymakers are thought to have an informational 
advantage over private agents and so able to reduce fluctuations of 
output around its natural rate, they must be able to make correct in- 
ferences about the precise character of  current shocks. That does not 
seem to be the case. 
Theory and evidence strongly suggest that a systematic monetary 
rule is superior to discretion. A fixed rule with no feedback from the 
current situation to policy instruments, a rule that is simple and prean- 
nounced, is the most favorable condition for stabilizing the economy. 
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sector’s forecast errors is doomed to failure. There is no information 
available to authorities that is not also available to the private sector. 
A fixed, simple, preannounced rule can take a number of forms. For 
some who are opposed to discretionary policy, the preferred systematic 
rule is the gold standard rule, for others, an interest rate or price rule. 
We  do not examine the reason such rules have won support from their 
adherents. The rule we favor is a constant monetary growth rule.  It 
satisfies the requirement for a systematic preannounced policy or re- 
gime that economic agents can incorporate in their expectations. It is 
a rule which can easily be implemented.  The case for it, as stated 
initially by Friedman, is that economists lack adequate knowledge to 
conduct discretionary policy successfully. A monetary growth rule would 
obviate monetary policy mistakes. When physicians take the Hippo- 
cratic oath, they pledge not to do harm to their patients. Economists 
should take a similar oath with respect to the instruments that they 
may be in a position to administer. 
The development of the rational expectations approach suggests that 
public  response to stable monetary growth  would contribute to the 
stabilization of the economy. Constant monetary growth will not make 
the business cycle obsolete. But avoidance of the mistakes of discre- 
tionary monetary policy will reduce the amplitude of fluctuations in- 
evitable in a dynamic economy. 
10.5  Divergent Views on a Constant Monetary Growth Rule 
Economists who accept the primacy of monetary change in producing 
changes in economic activity do not all agree that the policy solution 
is to adopt a rule for constant monetary growth. We  may distinguish 
the views of adherents of global monetarism, Austrian economics, and 
the new monetary economics. 
Global monetarism  emphasizes that the world economy is highly 
integrated with respect both to commodity and capital markets, inter- 
national price and interest rate arbitrage serving to coordinate national 
economies. The appropriate unit of analysis, therefore, is not the in- 
dividual national economy but rather the world. The elements of the 
doctrine were constructed for a world of fixed exchange rates where 
the domestic rate of inflation is determined exogenously by the world 
rate of inflation, and the domestic money stock is determined by the 
rate of growth of domestic nominal income, set by the world inflation 
rate. For such an approach, prescribing a rule for domestic monetary 
growth is pointless.  Under a flexible rate regime, however, domestic 
monetary authorities can control their money supplies if they choose. 
Regardless  of the exchange rate regime, global monetarism  has not 
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Austrian economics acknowledges the role of  monetary policy in 
producing inflation, and shares the monetarist view that the result of 
monetary attempts to reduce unemployment below its natural level is 
accelerating inflation. The chief emphasis, however, is less on these 
propositions than on the distortions in the production process resulting 
from monetary expansion. Moreover, in Austrian economics, flexible 
exchange rates are not the path to domestic monetary control. Hayek, 
for example, favors fixed exchange rates as a constraint on the gov- 
ernment’s overexpansion of the domestic money supply. The preferred 
solution, however, is the abolition  of central banks, and the estab- 
lishment of a commodity money. Hayek recently has advocated the 
denationalization of money and giving private producers freedom to 
offer alternative kinds of money. The market would then choose the 
money that would prove to be stable. Hence no legislated rule would 
be required. 
The new monetary economics enters under the free-market banner. 
In the system that we are familiar with, money is the product of per- 
vasive government regulation. Had free-market policies prevailed for 
transactions services, economists  of that persuasion  argue, a more 
efficient banking system would have been created, and velocity would 
have  been  much different. The new  monetary  economics therefore 
opposes a constant monetary growth rule on the ground that macro- 
economic performance, under free-market provision of money, could 
be much better than a rule would have produced. Different schemes 
have been elaborated by members of this school to replace an ineffi- 
ciently regulated money stock, but as Hall (1982, p. 1555) writes: “None 
of them would rely on the concept of  a money stock or its stability 
relative to total income. Whether their macroeconomic performance 
would equal that of  a simple money growth rule is still a matter of 
controversy.” 
Proposals to change utterly root and branch the existing monetary 
system strike us as ignoring the enormous attachment of the private 
sector to  arrangements that have become customary. Imposing a system 
that appeals to visionaries as far more satisfactory than the one markets 
have adjusted to, given the existing network of regulations, is not the 
historical way in which alterations in the monetary system have oc- 
curred. A complete breakdown in existing arrangements as a result, 
say, of  the catastrophe of hyperinflation  would be a prerequisite  to 
adoption de novo of one of the schemes the new monetary economics 
espouses. 
The new monetary economics, by proclaiming that results superior 
to those of a monetary growth rule are within reach, shares some of 
the confidence of interventionists.  Advocates of  a monetary growth 
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by interventionists, but also about the prospects that new schemes for 
settling transactions can be as  easily implemented as they can be devised. 
Some observers predict that the deregulation process now under way 
will obscure the quality of moneyness of assets and hence render con- 
trol by the central bank problematical. We regard this apocalyptic view 
as unduly  alarmist. Not  so long ago, it was commonly argued  that 
payment of interest on demand deposits would mean the end of their 
use as transactions balances. That has not happened and we do not 
foresee radical changes on the horizon in the operation of the payments 
system. The alternatives are not the creation de novo of a set of mon- 
etary arrangements or the preservation unchanged of  the existing set. 
For all the talk of the adoption of monetarism by central banks, their 
performance gives little indication that they in fact have been influenced 
by the central message of the doctrine-monetary  instability is a potent 
source of unstable economic performance. Note, for example, the wide 
swings that have been observed even in a smoothed two-quarter moving 
average of  the U.S. money growth rate since 1980-1.9  percent in the 
second quarter, 5.8 percent in the third quarter, followed by 13.2 per- 
cent in the fourth quarter; in the four quarters of  1981, 8.1, 7.1, 4.9, 
3.0 percent; and in the first three quarters of  1982, 8.3, 7.1, and 3.4 
percent, with the fourth quarter figure a likely high multiple of the third 
quarter figure. Is this monetarism? 
A legislated rule has never been tried. It is a modest step towards 
restraining monetary authorities, but both theory and evidence suggest 
that it could be a giant step toward achieving economic stability. 
Notes 
1. Warburton (1964, p.  1328). In earlier studies, in the  1940s and  1950s, 
Warburton advocated a 5  percent annual growth  rate in the money stock, 
inclusive of an adjustment for a projected steady secular decline in velocity of 
1.5 percent per year.  The shift to a lower proposed  growth rate for money 
incorporated the assumption that the reversal in the trend of velocity in the 
1950s-from  negative to positive-would  continue. 
2.  Milton  Friedman has called our attention to the similarity between the 
results of a table he constructed for the period  19621 through 1982IV (divided 
at 19711 and 1973III), and of our table. He calculated a geometric mean of 12- 
term moving standard deviation of growth rates of M1, M2, and real output. 
The increase in the variability of M1 from 1962-71  to 1971-82  of 0.26 in his 
table matches our finding of an increase of 0.31; the increase in the variability 
of real output he found of 1.61 is almost identical with the increase of 1.62 in 
our table. For M2, in his table, the increase in variability from the first to the 
second period is much sharper than for M1--1.21  compared to 0.26 